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In 1975, the Senate designated a Committee, generally referred to as the Church 
Committee, to investigate the unlawful actions of Intelligence Community member agencies 
such as the FBI and the CIA. During the preceding decade, the FBI had conducted several 
programs that infringed on American citizens’ rights, particularly in their Counterintelligence 
Program [COINTELPRO]. Although much research has been done into the effect that 
COINTELPRO had on the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the academics who were 
targeted due to their opposition to the Vietnam War have largely gone unnoticed. This thesis 
investigates the effect on those academics through the case study of the experiences of 
Anatol Rapoport. It goes on to trace the influence of the Church Community through time to 
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Declining Trust in Government 
In the early 1970s, a substantial segment of the American public severely lost trust in 
their government. The economic boom after World War II was ending.1 U.S. involvement in 
the Vietnam War deeply divided the nation, with some considering it to be a “crusade” 
seeking decisive victory over Communism, and others seeing it as a civil war with nation-
building and counterinsurgency missions at its core.2 Support for the war had been lagging, 
so military leaders chose to highlight the weakening of the opposing forces in response to 
American escalation.3 The 1968 Tet Offensive, “a massive uprising in almost every major 
town and city in South Vietnam,” shattered the image of impending victory that the 
American public held even though U.S. forces repelled the enemy.4 Although this last ditch 
effort by North Vietnam likely destroyed any real chance at a Viet Cong military victory and 
failed to remove the American forces, the people of the United States saw the war as 
unwinnable from that moment on at least at a price the public was willing to pay.5 After the 
                                                
Journal of Strategic Security 
1 John A. Lawrence, “Cleaning House,” Foreign Affairs 100, no. 1, (2021): n.p., 
http://search.ebscohost.com.easydb.angelo.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f6h&AN=147335
512&site=eds-live. 
2 Dominic Tierney, “The Two Vietnam Wars: American Perceptions of the Use of Force,” 
Political Science Quarterly 133, no. 4 (2018): 641-667, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12836, 
641. 
3 Jake Blood, The Tet Effect: Intelligence and the Public Perception of War (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2012), 35. 
4 Tierney, “The Two Vietnam Wars,” 647. 
5 Blood, The Tet Effect, 16. 
2 
war, the full extent of the leaders’ misleading statements was revealed. The American public 
felt lied to and struggled to trust their military and political leaders.  
This sense of distrust extended to the Presidency when, in 1974, five individuals 
dressed in business suits and surgical gloves planted illegal listening devices in the 
Democratic Party’s offices in the Watergate building in Washington, D.C.6 These individuals 
were members of President Nixon’s campaign and were revealed to be involved in an 
operation of political espionage and sabotage sanctioned and run by the President’s top 
aides.7 Stanley Kutler, the leading historian of the Watergate Scandal, said the incident 
“consumed and convulsed the nation and tested the constitutional and political system as it 
had not been tested since the Civil War.”8 Pew Center surveys measured a significant drop in 
the confidence that Americans had in their elected leaders from 77% in 1964 to 36% in 
1974.9 
Soon after the Watergate hearings set the stage for impeachment charges and 
President Nixon’s resignation, the New York Times published an article which accused the 
Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] of being involved in assassination plots.10 Not only did 
this report assert that the CIA had been involved in such plots around the world, but they 
                                                
6 Mark Feldstein, “Watergate Revisited,” American Journalism Review 26, no. 4 (2004): 62 
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.easydb.angelo.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=9&sid=327e27f
2-b59d-4cc4-8ea5-7311ba34acf1%40sessionmgr101. 
7 Feldstein, “Watergate Revisited,” 62. 
8 Quoted in Feldstein, “Watergate Revisited,” 62. 
9 Lawrence, “Cleaning House.” 
10 Lawrence, “Cleaning House;” “C.I.A. PLOT TO KILL CASTRO DESCRIBED,” New 
York Times, April 30, 1975, 9, https://www.nytimes.com/1975/04/30/archives/cia-plot-to-
kill-castro-described-agency-flew-2-assassins-to-cuba.html. 
3 
were accused of interfering with the democratically elected Allende regime in Chile during 
the same time frame.11  This seemed to become the final straw in the public’s trust in their 
government, and a strong push for accountability developed throughout the nation. 
In the midterm election of November 1974, a young group of idealistic reformers ran 
for office. These individuals, called the “Watergate babies,” campaigned from the position of 
a dedication to “restoring public faith in government.”12 They filled 92 seats in the House of 
Representatives for the 94th Congressional Session.13 Their election brought reform to the 
forefront of the Congressional agenda.  
Less than two months into the 94th Congress, a committee was formed to investigate 
allegations of domestic intelligence overreach by the secret agencies of the United States as a 
response to the accusations in the New York Times article.14 The Senate Select Committee to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, “mercifully known 
as the Church Committee” after its Chairman Senator Frank Church, came together and 
unearthed many violations of individuals’ rights.15 One such program that they exposed was 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]’s Counter Intelligence Program, nicknamed 
                                                
11 Loch K. Johnson, National Security Intelligence (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2017), 163. 
12 Lawrence, “Cleaning House,” n.p. 
13 Lawrence, “Cleaning House,” n.p. 
14 U.S. Congress, 1976, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), Final Report, 95th Congress, 1st 
sess., May, S. Rept. 94-755. [Hereafter cited as Church Report, Book II] Senate Resolution 
21, 343.  
15 Michael German and Frederick A.O. Schwarz, “Rethinking Intelligence: Interview with 




COINTELPRO. This program violated the civil liberties of American citizens throughout the 
nation and across the political spectrum. Among the many groups investigated under this 
program was the amorphous New Left. One particular target group – the academics whose 
careers were forever altered if not destroyed by the covert actions of the FBI – represents a 
largely underresearched portion of COINTELPRO operations.16 This thesis uses one 
particular academic, Anatol Rapoport, as a case study to explore typical actions utilized by 
the Bureau in support of COINTELPRO’s attack on New Left campus activism and the 
broader Church Committee investigations into FBI activities. 
Literature Review 
Sources such as Tim Weiner’s Enemies and Curt Gentry’s J. Edgar Hoover: The Man 
and the Secrets established the hierarchal culture of the FBI at the time, with its emphasis on 
conformity and preserving the image crafted by Director Hoover.17 Enemies of Intelligence 
by Richard K. Betts (2007) provides context for the FBI’s role within the greater Intelligence 
Community.18 Similarly, Mark M. Lowenthal discusses the role of intelligence, oversight, 
and the FBI in his book Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (2017).19 These sources 
establish the framework for understanding how the agency’s legitimate mission became 
                                                
16 An excellent resource for further reading on the student branch of the New Left 
investigations is Subversives by Seth Rosenfeld (2012) which focuses on student radicals 
from UC Berkeley, Ronald Reagan, and the FBI. 
17 Tim Weiner, Enemies. A History of the FBI (New York, NY: Random House USA, 2013); 
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: the Man and the Secrets (New York, NY: Norton, 2001). 
18 Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National 
Security (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
19 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 2017). 
5 
entwined in political agendas that fostered unwarranted intrusion in the lives of American 
citizens. 
Michael Linfield provides a comprehensive overview of the repression of dissent in 
war time in his book Freedom Under Fire: U.S. Civil Liberties in Times of War (1990).20 
Scholars have written several books about the student experience with Vietnam protests; one 
example is Subversives: The FBI’s War on Student Radicals and Reagan’s Rise to Power 
(2012) by Seth Rosenfeld which focuses on the relationship between Ronald Reagan (the 
40th President of the United States), Mario Savio (a student activist at the University of 
California, Berkeley), and Clark Kerr (the liberal President of the University of California).21 
Another good source for student issues and protests is Campus Wars by Kenneth J. 
Heineman (1993) which focuses on the experiences of students at state universities across the 
nation.22 These sources provide the broad context to understand the perceived threat of 
campus activism and the range of FBI interventions. 
COINTELPRO: The FBI’s Secret War on Political Freedom (2018) by Nelson 
Blackstock gives a good overview of the FBI’s program.23 Historians and political scientists 
alike have covered COINTELPRO as it relates to the life of Martin Luther King Jr. 
extensively in countless papers and articles, but most of them are drawn from The FBI, 
                                                
20 Michael Linfield, Freedom Under Fire: U.S. Civil Liberties in Times of War (Boston: 
South End Press, 1990). 
21 Seth Rosenfeld, Subversives: the FBI's War on Student Radicals, and Reagan's Rise to 
Power (New York, NY: Picador, 2013). 
22 Kenneth J. Heineman, Campus Wars: the Peace Movement at American State Universities 
in the Vietnam Era (New York, NY: Univ. Press, 2010). 
23 Nelson Blackstock, Cointelpro: the FBI's Secret War on Political Freedom (New York, 
NY: Monad Press, 1975). 
6 
COINTELPRO, and Martin Luther King, Jr. (1975), which is a report from the Church 
Committee.24 Fewer studies have been conducted on the side of the FBI’s program connected 
to the university professors who were working to educate the public on the history of the 
conflict in Vietnam. Campus Wars by Kenneth Heineman (1993) only mentions the FBI’s 
actions in passing, and fleeting references occur in works by Loch Johnson and others. 
Johnson specifically references one particular academic, Anatol Rapoport in several works.  
Anatol Rapoport, a mathematician and former Communist, was a professor at the 
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor involved in the anti-war movement. He wrote an 
autobiography called Certainties and Doubts (2000) that focuses more generally on his 
philosophy of life rather than concentrating on the details of the FBI investigations into his 
life.25 It does, however, describe his mindset during this era and gives valuable insight into 
his peace research. His peace writings have been published fairly extensively. His son, 
Anthony, has released many of Rapoport’s writings and speeches on anatolrapoport.net. 
There is no biography and only limited mentions of his experience with the FBI’s 
investigation by Johnson in his book Secret Agencies (1998).26 He mentions the case briefly 
but does not focus significantly on the specific details of the investigation. An American 
Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (1989) also briefly documents 
                                                
24 Church Report, Book II; Tim Weiner, Enemies. A History of the FBI (New York, NY: 
Random House USA, 2013). 
25 Anatol Rapoport, Certainties and Doubts: a Philosophy of Life (Montréal, Canada: Black 
Rose Books, 2000). 
26 Loch K. Johnson, “Congressional Supervision of America's Secret Agencies: The 
Experience and Legacy of the Church Committee,” Public Administration Review 64, no. 1 
(2004): 3-14, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00342.x 
7 
Rapoport’s involvement in the anti-Vietnam movement.27 These sources serve to set the 
stage for the FBI’s investigation into Rapoport and, by extension, the broader academic 
community in the absence of the actual case files. A Freedom Of Information Act request for 
the case files regarding Rapoport was approved but delayed due to the closure of the Library 
of Congress due to the Covid-19 Pandemic. Case files from the FBI’s online vault from the 
Detroit Field Office written during the Rapoport investigation, however, illustrate the types 
of abuses of power that were being conducted at the time in Rapoport’s area.28 Anthony 
Rapoport, Anatol Rapoport’s son, agreed to give an interview on his perspective on his 
father’s life and work to assist in answering any questions.  
For the actual Church Committee, this thesis relies heavily on the actual Church 
Committee report, specifically Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans 
(1976) in relation to the specific targeting of Rapoport and analyzing the implications of the 
FBI and their investigations.29 Dr. Loch K. Johnson, a staff member for the Church 
Committee, has written prolifically about the Committee and their report. Many of his books, 
like A Season of Inquiry (1985), center generally on the role of Congress in the oversight of 
federal agencies.30 The recommendations of the Church Committee continue to echo in 
today’s Intelligence Community. Efforts of future administrations to implement or alter 
Church Committee recommendations are documented in Natsu Saito’s “Whose Liberty? 
                                                
27 Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: the Antiwar Movement 
of the Vietnam War (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1989), 29, 107-109. 
28 “COINTELPRO New Left Detroit Part 01 of 01,” FBI (FBI, May 5, 2011), 
https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro/new-left/cointel-pro-new-left-detroit-part-01-of-01/view 
29 Church Report, Book II. 
30 Loch K. Johnson, Season of Inquiry Revisited (Kansas City, Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 2016). 
8 
Whose Security.”31 Additionally, Fritz A.O. Schwarz, the Chief Counsel of the Church 
Committee, wrote Unchecked and Unbalanced (2007) – a critique of the Bush White 
House’s handling of the war on terror as illustrated by the subtitle, “Presidential Power in a 
Time of Terror.”32 This book utilizes the framework developed by the Church Committee to 
judge the power accumulated after the tragic events of September 11, 2001.   
Structure of this Thesis 
The preface briefly explores the existing literature on the topic to establish a gap that 
this thesis seeks to fill. Chapter one explores the FBI’s COINTELPRO from its establishment 
in the 1950s to its expansion into most facets of American life, including academic life, until 
its end in the early 1970s. The second chapter delves deeply into Anatol Rapoport’s life and 
experience with the FBI. It considers the political and academic beliefs which led him to be a 
target of the FBI, the range of FBI activities against him, and his response to the harassment. 
Chapter three establishes the founding of the Church Committee and its members and 
methods.  The fourth chapter explores the findings and subsequent recommendations that the 
Church Committee published in their report. The conclusion examines the long-term effects 
of the Committee’s recommendations and considers the relevance of those guidelines for the 
current Intelligence Community. 
This work strives to widen academic research into the effect of FBI overreach on the 
educators whose lives were systematically torn apart by the covert actions of FBI agents. 
                                                
31 Natsu Taylor Saito, “Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the 
Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent,” Oregon Law 
Review 81 (September 30, 2003). 
32 Frederic A.O. Schwarz and Aziz Z. Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power 
in a Time of Terror (New York, NY: New Press, 2008). 
9 
Anatol Rapoport’s case is utilized as one example of their overreach and a cautionary tale to 
highlight parallels between the government’s power in the ‘60s due to the civil rights and 
anti-war activism and the current state of the government’s legal intrusion into American’s 
lives with the PATRIOT ACT and those challenges to privacy. It also examines how the 




Culture of the FBI 
During the 1950s, the government gave the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] the 
impossible task of predicting and preventing violence.33 In 1950 and 1953 respectively, 
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower authorized the FBI to investigate “subversive activity” 
which was an incredibly broad and vague term that greatly expanded the Bureau’s 
responsibility.34 As tensions rose throughout the 1960s over racial conflict at home and the 
Vietnam War abroad, they received increasingly comprehensive requests from the 
Department of Justice [DOJ] and the White House for information on issues concerning 
racial and urban unrest.35 To give just one example, the DOJ asked for and received 
photographs of a civil rights protest scheduled on the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation 
Proclamation.36  
The combination of expanded responsibility and increased requests for information 
connected with political ideology rather than criminal activity directly opposed the Supreme 
Court and judicial system’s intentions. Restrictions on repercussions for individuals legally 
exercising their freedom of speech accompanied and directly contradicted these requests for 
expanded collection and surveillance of individuals who did not fit the mold of “typical” 
                                                
33 U.S. Congress, 1976, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), Final Report, 95th Congress, 1st 
sess., May, S. Rept. 94-755. [Hereafter cited as Church Report, Book II], 82. 
34 Church Report, Book II, 45. 
35 Church Report, Book II, 82. 
36  Church Report, Book II, 82. 
11 
Americans.37 The Supreme Court greatly lessened the parameters for criminal prosecution of 
individuals involved in the Communist Party USA, one of the first domestic groups targeted 
by the FBI. This incentivized the Bureau to find alternate ways “to contain the threat” posed 
by such atypical citizens.38 
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover called individuals of interest in the agency’s domestic 
intelligence investigations “vociferous rabble rousers” which led to the creation of the Rabble 
Rouser Index containing information on individuals who “tr[y] to arouse people to violent 
action by appealing to their emotions, prejudices, et cetera; a demagogue.”39 This tasking led 
to excessive and unwarranted collection of information about all facets of life and on anyone 
even vaguely related to groups of concern like the Communist Party USA. The FBI, while 
acting within their parameters to conduct investigations into many of these areas, committed 
numerous improper acts during their pursuit of the eradication of violence that were certainly 
not warranted.40 
In order to contain these perceived threats to the status quo, the FBI enacted several 
programs during the 1950s and 60s. Covert techniques such as electronic surveillance which 
included warrantless wiretaps and “bugging” – the act of placing microphones through 
trespassing without authorization of a judge or the knowledge or consent of the individual 
whose space was bugged – dominated the concerning programs carried out by the Bureau 
                                                
37 Saito, “Whose Liberty? Whose Security,” 1080. 
38 Church Report, Book II, 67. 
39 Church Report, Book II, 90. 
40 Church Report, Book II, 270. 
12 
during this era.41 The FBI filed “black bag jobs,” which were “surreptitious entries conducted 
for purposes other than installing a ‘bug,’” under their “Do Not File” program which was 
designed to limit the possibility of an outside agency discovering their actions. Though these 
entries required approval from Hoover or his assistant Clyde Tolson, there was likely no 
oversight from even the Executive Branch as there is no record of any Attorney General 
being informed of these jobs. FBI personnel destroyed any documentation of these actions at 
the end of an internal inspection each year.42 Internal memos, the only surviving physical 
evidence that this program existed, provide damning evidence that, even internally, these 
jobs were considered “clearly illegal.”43 These tactics are just a few examples of the illegal 
activities engaged in by the FBI during this era. 
The culture of the FBI flowed from the top down. An Assistant Director, William 
Sullivan, quoted Ralph Waldo Emerson when talking about his training and indoctrination 
into the FBI: “An institution is the lengthened shadow of one man.”44 The culture of the 
Bureau was such that the hierarchy encouraged agents out in the field to investigate cases to 
confirm headquarters’ priorities rather than their parameters being informed by the trends 
found out in the field.45 While many of the ideas for programs came from subordinates like 
Sullivan, Hoover’s signature could be found on every memo communicating the decisions 
                                                
41 Church Report, Book II, 60. 
42  Church Report, Book II, 62. 
43  Church Report, Book II, 62. 
44 Tim Weiner, Enemies. A History of the FBI (New York, NY: Random House USA, 2013), 
196. 
45 David Cunningham and Barb Browning, “The Emergence of Worthy Targets: Official 
Frames and Deviance Narratives Within the FBI,” Sociological Forum 19, no. 3 (September 
2004): 349, https://doi.org/10.1023/b:sofo.0000042553.21098.f6. 
13 
that led to illegal actions often saying “I concur” or “O.K. H.”46 Hoover’s power and 
influence cannot be understated when considering the actions of the FBI during his tenure as 
director of the FBI.  
When Hoover first ascended to the position of Bureau Director, it was meant to be a 
temporary position.47 During his first few weeks, however, he “rebuilt the Bureau of 
Investigation from top to bottom.”  He established six separate branches with unique areas of 
responsibility. He also instituted a system of hierarchical memo writing. This ensured that 
any information of interest would make its way to the upper leadership.48 One of his greatest 
contributions to the FBI was standardization. Likely as a carry over from his time as a clerk 
at the Library of Congress, he designed a system of filing so that “[a]n agent reassigned 
from… Jacksonville, Florida, to Seattle, Washington, could on his first day walk right in and 
begin using the files."49  
Director Hoover exercised an incredible amount of power over the entire culture of 
the Bureau. By virtue of being in that position for decades, he accumulated quite a bit of 
influence within Washington, D.C. and across the country. One of his biographers, Curt 
Gentry, discussed Hoover’s secret dossiers of blackmail information which afforded him 
power over individuals throughout the country.50 This allowed him to control the FBI the 
way that he found most appropriate without much input from outside agencies. 
                                                
46 Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: the Man and the Secrets (New York, NY: Norton, 2001), 
445. 
47 Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover, 127. 
48 Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover, 129. 
49 Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover, 130. 
50 Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover, 51. 
14 
While he did have official say and a huge hand into the culture of the Bureau, he was 
not the only individual involved in the creation of this program and cannot be blamed for all 
of the incorrect things being done within the FBI at that time. One key program – the Counter 
Intelligence Program, shortened to COINTELPRO – which he did approve, actually came 
from the ideas of agents out in the field and other members of the Bureau’s leadership.51  
Foundation of COINTELPRO 
The FBI created COINTELPRO in 1956. This branch investigated domestic 
intelligence issues and aimed to “‘disrupt’ groups and ‘neutralize’ individuals deemed to be 
threats to domestic security.”52 COINTELPRO was the brainchild of William Sullivan, who, 
at its inception, was the aide to the chief of the FBI’s Intelligence Division.53 His 
involvement in the program led to a ten-year membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board and 
an eventual promotion to Assistant Director over domestic intelligence. Sullivan later stated 
that the general focus of the program was “will this course of action work, will it get us what 
we want, will it reach the objective we desire to reach?” rather than any considation of the 
legality, morals, or ethics of their programs.54  
 Simply put, counterintelligence is “the work of preventing spies from stealing your 
secrets.”55 Originally, the FBI focused on the Communist Party USA, but the targets slowly 
                                                
51 “COINTELPRO,” FBI (FBI, May 5, 2011), https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro. 
52 Church Report, Book II, 10. 
53 Weiner, Enemies, 195. 
54 David Cunningham, “The Patterning of Repression: FBI Counterintelligence and the New 
Left,” Social Forces 82, no. 1 (September 1, 2003): 214, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2003.0079. 
55 Weiner, Enemies, 195. 
15 
expanded to include groups that might have been infiltrated by Communists such as “Parent-
Teacher Associations, civil organizations, and racial and religious groups.”56 This grew into 
the five separate initiatives created within the program — Communist Party USA, Socialist 
Workers Party, White Hate Groups, Black Nationalist/Hate Groups, and the New Left.57 
 During the 1960s, COINTELPRO agents were very busy. They searched for 
“subversive ‘influence’” in groups at the extreme ends of both the left and right political 
spectrum.58 Individuals later investigating this program stated: “[t]he government could have 
set an example for the nation’s citizens and prevented spiraling lawlessness by respecting the 
law as it took steps to predict or prevent violence. But agencies of the United States, 
sometimes abetted by public opinion and government officials, all too often disregarded the 
Constitutional rights of American [sic] in their conduct of domestic intelligence 
operations.”59 The limitations placed on Communist convictions by the Supreme Court led to 
this more secret and illegal way that the FBI devised to take down those they perceived to be 
enemies to the American way of life.60  
Agents used many different tactics such as exploiting local news agencies to actively 
disrupt the legal actions of these groups.61 These strategies were often “sharpened at the 
suggestion of agents in the field, toughened by Sullivan, and ultimately approved by 
                                                
56 Church Report, Book II, 65, 67. 
57 Cunningham and Browning, The Emergence of Worthy Targets, 351. 
58 Church Report, Book II, 33. 
59 Church Report, Book II, 68. 
60 Church Report, Book II, 67. 
61 Nelson Blackstock, Cointelpro: the FBI's Secret War on Political Freedom (New York, 
NY: Monad Press, 1975), 14. 
16 
Hoover.”62 Many of these tactics had been in use since the 1940s, but Hoover “now felt so 
secure in his power that he could grant official sanction to actions which went well beyond 
the law.”63 The FBI instructed their agents that “Every avenue of possible embarrassment 
must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored.”64  
Activities within COINTELPRO, even at its height in the late 1960s, consisted of a 
“small fraction of agents’ activities.”65 However, the pressure to continue and even ramp up 
efforts from headquarters to field offices attempting to close their COINTELPRO 
investigations indicated a worrying trend in domestic subversion investigations and the 
culture of the FBI at large. For example, the Knoxville Field Office attempted to close their 
investigation into the New Left because of the successful efforts of local university officials 
to limit activities by student activist groups. They had not experienced any serious violence 
on local campuses; however, headquarters argued that, because of national potential for 
violence, the local “benign” chapters’ existence in their area was enough impetus for 
Knoxville to continue their investigations.66 This interplay between the national priorities and 
locally observed threats showed a worrying divide. This encouraged a trend of overcollection 
rather than undercollection in investigations.  
This type of attitude led to warranted commentary from Tom Huston, a witness to this 
type of overcollection before the Church Committee Hearings of 1975 due to his earlier 
                                                
62 Weiner, Enemies, 195. 
63 Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover, 442. 
64 Church Report, Book II, 243. 
65 Cunningham, “Patterning of Repression,” 212. 
66 Cunningham, “Patterning of Repression,” 225. 
17 
involvement in gathering authority for expanded domestic investigative parameters. He 
opined that this power was dangerous because of the potential to “construe political 
considerations to be national security considerations” which would lead to the same tactics 
used against the “kid with the bomb” also being brought against “the kid with the bumper 
sticker of the opposing candidate.” He warned that it would be all too easy to keep a cycle 
going in that direction without any external consideration of the true threat posed by the 
individual being investigated.67 
COINTELPRO New Left Investigations 
New Left groups, including the “civil-rights movement, free speech movement, anti-
war movement, and the women’s liberation movement,” made up an entire subsection of the 
groups that the FBI investigated under COINTELPRO, even though only a small portion of 
groups dedicated to social change deliberately used violence to effect change.68 The New 
Left was incredibly difficult to define. As one agent put it, “It has never been strictly defined, 
as far as I know… It’s more or less an attitude, I would think.”69 The lack of clear definition 
allowed the term to be applied indiscriminately to individuals involved in demonstrations 
against American involvement in Vietnam as well as student groups who generally disagreed 
with the government.  
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Much has been written about covert investigations of key civil rights activists, most 
notably Martin Luther King, Jr. He was targeted by the Bureau because of his civil rights 
activism under COINTELPRO’s civil rights and black nationalist investigative branch.70 The 
absolutely shocking actions taken against him have been well documented through many 
articles and books, including a separate report from the Church Committee.71  
King’s antiwar activities are less well-known, but just as subversive in the FBI’s eyes. 
In 1967, in support of his vocal opposition to the Vietnam War, he wrote a rousing 
“Declaration of Independence from the War in Vietnam.” He expounded on “the cruel irony 
of watching Negro [sic] and white boys on TV screens as they kill and die together for a 
nation that has been unable to seat them together in the same schools.”72 He argued that the 
“brotherhood of man” extended past an individual's skin color or their national allegiance to 
their humanity. King further criticized the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War 
because of Vietnam's proclamation of independence in 1945 which the U.S. ignored at the 
time in order to support France.73 He called for compassion and non-violence in order to help 
“us to see the enemy’s point of view, to hear his questions to know his assessment of 
ourselves… if we are mature, we may learn and grow and profit from the wisdom of the 
brothers who are called the opposition.74” FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover saw King’s 
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influence and point of view as a victory for the Communists and believed that the black 
nationalist movement provided “real opportunities for foreign exploitation” because their 
challenge to the status quo might encourage foreign governments to try to use the movement 
for their own purposes.75 
Teach-Ins 
Less well-documented are the FBI’s investigations into academicians involved in the 
antiwar movement. Much has been written about the overall movement, but the influential 
individuals involved in changing students' minds all over the country have been looked at 
much less. Similarly to the spirit of education and growth espoused by King, the concept of 
teach-ins were developed by faculty members of the New Left. At the University of 
Michigan, forty to fifty faculty members organized a teach-in to show their disgust and 
concern with the American involvement in the Vietnam War.76 The concept was “an 
analogue of a sit-in strike.”77 In those situations, American workers would occupy the 
working space instead of forming a picket line. This posed a more serious challenge to the 
bosses who wanted them removed so that work could resume.  
Similarly, organizers designed the teach-in to avoid such pitfalls as breaching contract 
by not teaching or attempting to have non-expert faculty use their class time (for which they 
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were being paid) to explain the complicated and long history of the conflict in Vietnam.78 
The teach-in also took place after teaching hours which would negate the argument that it 
was disturbing their contracted schedule.79 The first event in Michigan spanned from 8 P.M. 
to 9 A.M. the night between March 24 and 25, 1965. The program consisted of various mass 
meetings and seminars with free sandwiches and coffee provided in between the sessions.  
This concept of a teach-in expanded across campuses throughout the United States 
and Canada. The topics varied depending on the speakers, but they all focused on educating 
the American public openly and freely about the true nature of the conflict in Vietnam in 
order to encourage public debate and civic involvement.80 This all culminated in a massive 
teach-in in Washington, D.C., on May 15, 1965, which was broadcast across the nation to an 
estimated fifty campuses.81 This was planned to be a great debate between civilian and 
Presidential experts on America’s involvement in Vietnam to allow for the American public 
to receive a comprehensive view of the pros and cons of this conflict.82 
Because of their focus on all anti-war movements, especially those with reach and 
influence, the FBI became interested in the teach-ins and kept track of those who had been 
involved. In an anonymous letter sent to various community leaders in Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
an FBI agent wrote about several faculty members at the University of Michigan in regards 
to their participation in such political activities as the teach-in and formerly being members 
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of the Communist Party.83 As all of the names in the report documenting this action are 
redacted, the identity of the individual faculty members cannot be determined from this 
source; however, it is reasonable to assume that Rapoport would have been among those 
identified. 
Similar memos, however, later indicate the Bureau’s perceived success through the 
result of several faculty members losing their jobs.84 Such anonymous letters often found 
their way into the press as the FBI used their privilege with news agencies to spread 
information that they desired to be made public. In the records of their actions against faculty 
at the University of Michigan, the FBI listed several news organizations including student 
newspapers and local news agencies as recipients of the harmful letters.85 They used their 
contacts at news agencies big and small to anonymously influence the American public and 
to subtly apply pressure against individuals and institutions. 
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ANATOL RAPOPORT 
Anatol Rapoport was one of the faculty member at the University of Michigan who 
came under investigation from the FBI. He was a founder of the original teach-in in 
Michigan and helped organize the Washington, D.C. meeting.86 His experience with 
harassment from the FBI encapsulated many of the tactics often used in the New Left 
investigations. A case study of his life and background illustrates the difficulty faced by the 
Bureau in attempting to establish the innocence of an individual as opposed to their guilt and 
gives perspective to the lasting impact that the FBI’s actions had on the lives of the 
individuals they targeted. 
Overview 
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], Anatol Rapoport, a Russian-
born professor at the University of Michigan, posed a threat to American democracy and had 
to be silenced. His crime was his often stated opinion that the United States should not be 
involved in the Vietnam War and his possible influence from his position as a professor at 
the University of Michigan who helped create the teach-in which became a national 
phenomenon across college campuses in the United States and Canada.87 The FBI’s strategy 
to neutralize him included sending letters anonymously to the university president, the 
governor of Michigan, and other officials to attempt to discredit and remove Rapoport from 
his position.88 The FBI utilized this tactic along with several others until he left the country, 
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eventually relocating to Toronto, Canada, where he served as a professor at the University of 
Toronto and a guest lecturer around the world.89 Rapoport’s case, and many like it involving 
antiwar and civil rights activists, reflects the type of agency overreach and questionable 
tactics engaged in by the FBI in the 1960s that belatedly caught the attention of Congress and 
led to Senate hearings and recommendations for reform. 
Anatol Rapoport’s Background 
Anatol Rapoport’s presumed danger originated in part from his birth in Lozovaya, 
Ukraine in 1911.90 Through his experience growing up in Russia and Chicago, studying 
music in America and Vienna before the Second World War, studying mathematical physics 
at the University of Chicago, and serving in the United States Army Air Corps during the 
war, Rapoport had developed a pacifistic world view.91 He believed in the concepts of 
Communism that he had learned as a child through the Social-Democratic Bolsheviks’ 1917 
motto of “Down with the War.”92  He was a member of the Communist Party from 
November, 1938 until he enlisted in the Army Air Corps in December, 1941.93 While he had 
been losing faith in the Party for a while, he resigned due to the Party’s request that all 
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members who enlisted quit the Party to ensure that there was “no basis for suspecting 
Communists of divided loyalty.”94 Clearly, this did not keep the FBI from being suspicious 
of him later in life. 
World War II Service 
His clear anti-war stance in the 1960s kept him in the sights of the FBI agents who 
were focusing on “neutralizing” the Communist threat. Still, it was not the first time that the 
U.S. government investigated him because of his political opinions, nor was it the first time 
his career prospects were hampered by his unapologetic conversations. While he served in 
the Army Air Corp during World War II, he worked as a Russian translator in Alaska for the 
pilots who flew across the Bering Strait for supplies and facilitated American and Russian 
cooperation. Being fluent in Russian, he enjoyed spending time with the Russian pilots who 
were members of the project. He also was occasionally invited to dinner with a local banker 
who was the richest man in Nome. One evening after the meal, his conversation with the 
banker, the commanding general of the infantry brigade, and the commander of the air base 
turned to politics. Those three despaired of the New Deal and the “erosion of American 
values.” Rapoport was “rather outspoken in expressing [his] views” to the contrary.95  
After the war, the banker met him in Chicago during one of his trips. He surprised 
him by bringing along Rapoport’s old commanding officer, who informed him that a civilian 
who had spoken with Rapoport to “inspect the security provisions at the base” was actually 
there to conduct an investigation into him. A promotion to major that his commanding officer 
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had recommended him for was blocked because of that investigator’s report.96 Even before 
the Cold War, Rapoport’s political views and Russian background put him in the crosshairs 
for the United States government. However, it was his more recent actions that led to direct 
investigation and harassment from the FBI. 
Life in Academia 
Rapoport took his first job as a college teacher at the University of Chicago after 
choosing to leave the Army. While there, he studied the relativity of values, publishing his 
thoughts in his book Science and the Goals of Man. This work stated many of his 
foundational thoughts on the conflicts among people on the earth. For example, he developed 
a theory about the relativity of values among people from different cultures. These unique 
backgrounds would make individuals perceive the concepts of truth, good, and pleasant 
differently, contributing to the clashes between ideologies that cause so much pain and strife 
among peoples and cultures.97 He taught there until the McCarthy investigations in the 
1950s. He expected to be called and made to answer for his involvement in the Communist 
Party, but he was never asked to testify.98 When the University dismissed several of his 
colleagues who were called to testify, he resigned in protest and found a new position in 
California.99 
Despite the dangers exposed through the McCarthy hearings, Rapoport continued to 
speak openly about his convictions and political opinions. While Associate Professor of 
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Mathematical Biology at the Mental Health Research Institute at the University of Michigan, 
he joined other faculty members in organizing a teach-in to protest American involvement in 
the Vietnam War.100 Rapoport helped to organize the national teach-in in Washington, D.C., 
for May 15, 1965, that was broadcast across the nation to an estimated fifty campuses. 
Rapoport’s work at both teach-ins contributed to his three-pronged theory of peace: peace 
research for acquiring relevant knowledge, peace education for disseminating it, and peace 
activism for applying it.101 Given Rapoport’s former association with the Communist Party 
and his role in organizing the first teach-in, it is not surprising that he would be among those 
identified by the FBI as dangerous or, at the very least, interesting. 
Rapoport’s Peace Research 
In 1966, soon after the start of the teach-ins, Rapoport wrote thirty papers, sixteen of 
which were on the themes of “war or peace, [and] conflict or conflict resolution.”102 
Alongside Kenneth Boulding, a University of Michigan colleague who had helped to 
organize the teach-in, he founded the Journal of Conflict Resolution which “open[ed] a new 
field of peace research that would focus social scientific inquiry upon ‘the greatest problem 
of our time — the prevention of war.’”103 This type of activity expanded his influence and 
increased the likelihood of the FBI’s interest in him. While they were concerned that he 
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would lead others into violence which would threaten the United States, he was developing 
his concept of peace research as an “analogue of medical research.” Just as medical research 
had eradicated several diseases and prolonged general life expectancy through scientific 
evidence and research focused on the cause of diseases, he focused on the “necessary 
conditions of war” such as weapons in order to attempt to create a “cure” for war.104  
Another influential area of his research during his time in Michigan was his 
contribution to game theory with the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This non-zero sum game consists 
of two people answering a simple question, “given a choice between two alternatives what 
will a person do?”105 Two individuals who are strangers to each other are given two choices 
— cooperation with one another or noncooperation. If both choose cooperation, they get a 
reward. If only one chooses cooperation and the other chooses noncooperation, either the non 
cooperating player or the cooperating player gets the reward all to themselves. If both choose 
noncooperation, their payoff was a “punishment.” Along with Albert Chammah, he 
conducted three hundred rounds each between all types of people in order to gauge 
individuals’ reactions. In this research, he discovered one of his most influential concepts — 
TIT FOR TAT, which is a style of play in which the player responds to a move by playing 
the same move the next round or “an eye for an eye.”106  
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His research partner, Chammah, later discovered that “TIT FOR TAT tends to elicit 
more cooperation from the co-player than any other strategy.”107 Rapoport translated this into 
a computer strategy that won two separate tournaments testing out the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.108 The takeaway from this discovery was a theory of strategic negotiation in which 
the negotiator “learns to utilize the common interests of antagonists to his own advantage so 
as to get his own way without risking outcomes disastrous for both.”109 His son Anthony 
recalls that Rapoport dedicated his life to researching those concepts and developing a 
strategy to further peace research.110  
The FBI’s Involvement in Rapoport Life 
A memo from June 1968 likely marks one of the FBI’s attempts to discredit Anatol 
Rapoport and harm his career. It requests permission to send letters to a list of many 
influential community leaders and groups such as the University of Michigan Alumni 
Association, the local state senator, the local state representative, the regents of the 
University of Michigan, and the local newspaper The Ann Arbor News. A list of individuals 
of concern, including several professors and reverends whose names are all redacted, were 
specified as subjects of dissemination of public records through anonymous letters designed 
to strike fear into the reader and discredit the individuals mentioned.111 Because of the 
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censorship, it cannot be confirmed that he was one of those individuals specifically attacked 
in this memo; the tactics, however, line up well with those identified to have been used 
against Rapoport.112  
Around the same time, a government agent met Rapoport outside his house and asked 
him to come into the government office for a talk. He described the agents as “annoyingly 
polite and friendly.” They spoke with him about his ties to the Communist Party, which he 
gladly explained. He had felt that he had escaped persecution in Chicago and wanted a 
chance to stand up for his beliefs.113 The agents who spoke to him explained that “they were 
neither interested nor empowered to intimidate any one, that to do their job properly 
(guarding the internal security of the country) they had to be informed about everything that 
was going on.”114 They discussed his political beliefs, with the agents “asking intelligent 
questions and offering mild counter-arguments.” While he never specified what government 
agency these agents were from, the tactics and job description line up almost perfectly with 
COINTELPRO and recorded tactics from the FBI at the time. Rapoport said of the meeting, 
“I enjoyed myself” which seemed to both annoy and calm him.115  
He enjoyed a meeting with a member of the university administration much less. The 
administrator confronted him with information claiming that he had associated with 
“subversives” in the 1930s, citing several Communist fundraising events where Rapoport 
played piano. Rapoport asked “defiantly” what the administrator was going to do to which he 
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replied “nothing.” In both of these meetings he described being disarmed and feeling that 
becoming self-righteous would not be appropriate in the face of very little hostility.116 He 
survived this attack that was likely orchestrated by the FBI, but other colleagues did not as, 
two years later, the “termination” of several faculty members is listed under significant 
accomplishments of the COINTELPRO program in the Detroit Field Office.117  
There are only a few tactics which can be definitively confirmed to have been used 
against Rapoport. Malicious letters were certainly sent to his colleagues, as was confirmed by 
Rapoport’s dealings with his administrator. These letters, signed “a concerned citizen” or “a 
concerned taxpayer” also went to prominent citizens throughout the state in order to ruin his 
reputation. Additionally, an FBI agent tasked a source with reporting on Rapoport’s 
“subversive” activities and sent them to his classes to report on his teachings.118 They placed 
an incredible amount of pressure on Rapoport in an attempt to limit his sphere of influence. 
Life after the FBI 
In 1970, Rapoport moved to a new position as a faculty member in Canada. His son, 
Anthony, recalls several reasons that Rapoport chose to leave the United States, not least of 
which was the approaching draft age of his sons. He also had a sense that things could 
become much worse in the United States, both generally and personally. Additionally, he 
disliked feeling a responsibility to engage in American politics if he stayed along with the 
salesmanship that seemed necessary in order to have any influence. This led directly into the 
final reason, which consisted of his feeling that he would likely never be able to change the 
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commitment of those in power to secret activities and the institution of war.119 In this 
Canadian professorship in both the psychology and mathematics departments, Rapoport lived 
a satisfying life. His reputation in the fields of game theory and conflict resolution continued 
to expand, and he used his writings to continue to press for peace and cooperative 
engagement among people. He was able to travel the world as a guest lecturer, write four 
additional books, and spend quality time with his family.120 
Conclusion 
Anatol Rapoport was overall quite fortunate. While he was targeted for his beliefs and 
opinions, he maintained his professional reputation and made a satisfying life for himself and 
his family.121 Many of his friends were not as fortunate. The Bureau notes that some of them 
were able to find other positions after they were let go from their professorships. Still, not all 
individuals they targeted were able to move on and successfully continue their lives.122 
Anatol Rapoport left the University of Chicago and was able to find another position when 
several of his colleagues were investigated and harassed by the McCarthy investigations of 
the 1950s.123 Several of his peers at the University of Michigan were targeted and removed 
from their professional positions. At the same time, he was able to leave the country and find 
a fulfilling job in Canada. This should not, however, be interpreted as doing no harm to 
Rapoport since being essentially forced out of his adopted homeland to preserve his 
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livelihood and ensure the safety of his family is an action he cannot have taken lightly. While 
he was largely unaware of the extent of the FBI’s actions to discredit him, knowing that he 
could not fully express his convictions without repercussions to his career had to weigh 
heavily on a man of his integrity. The FBI’s targeting and intense program of being judge, 
jury, and (career) executioner was highly illegal and deserved all of the critiques and 




THE CHURCH COMMITTEE 
Establishment 
By the 1970s, American citizens were greatly suspicious of the intentions and actions 
of their government. This came from their experiences with events like the Tet Offensive and 
the Watergate Scandal discussed in the preface. They learned to be wary of government 
officials and to consider if they were truly acting in their best interests or even telling the 
truth. This distrust led to the election of many young, reform-minded individuals to the 
Senate in 1974. 
Not surprisingly, with these individuals in office, the discovery of overreach within 
the Intelligence Community led to heated debates. Historically, the Central Intelligence 
Agency [CIA] or Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] lacked involvement or challenges to 
their practices by Congress.124 On January 21, 1975, Senator John Pastore (D-RI), an 
influential senator, sponsored the Resolution to establish an investigative committee into the 
illegal actions of the CIA and FBI which had been alleged in newspapers. He opened the 
debate by saying:  
In recent weeks and in recent months, there have been charges 
and counter charges spelled out on the front page of every 
newspaper in this country… The people of America… are 
asking themselves, ‘what is actually happening to those 
organizations which are essential for the security and the 
survival of our great Nation?’ In order to clear the air, in order 
to cleanse whatever abuses there have been in the past, so that 
we can recite, once and for all, the proper parameters within 
which they can function [sic]125  
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The Resolution was placed on the calendar, and the Senate unanimously consented to 
hold two hours of debate followed by a vote on the passing of the Resolution which would 
create an investigative committee.126 The debate was split between two camps, those who 
subscribed to the concept of honorable men and women doing their best who should be left to 
their own devices and those who believed that the potential for abuse was too great and 
necessitated more thorough checks and balances. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) argued 
that, similarly to military operations, the President of the United States is the individual 
responsible for agencies “getting into fields... they did not want to get into.”127 Pastore 
responded, “The important thing here is to restore public confidence so that these agencies, in 
the final analysis, will be responsive. That is what this is all about.”128 Despite the apparent 
division, the Resolution passed with eighty-two yeas and only four nays.129 
The formation of the Church Committee began with Senate Resolution 21 which 
states: 
Resolved, To establish a select committee of the Senate to 
conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations 
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with respect to intelligence activities and of the extent, if any, 
to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged 
in by any agency of the Federal Government or by any persons 
acting individually or in combination with others, with respect 
to any intelligence activity carried out by or on behalf of the 
Federal Government.130 
The Resolution continued to establish the makeup of the Select Committee To Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The eleven members of the 
Committee were to consist of six Senators appointed by the President of the Senate from the 
Democratic majority and five Senators from the Republican minority.131 The majority 
members of the Committee would select the Chairman and the minority members would 
select the Vice Chairman. 132  
Members of the Committee 
Senator Pastore desired to see “new blood and faces” on this committee.133 Michael 
“Mitch” Mansfield, the leader of the Democratic majority from 1961 to 1977, said of the 
Democratic members, “What I tried to do was bring about a mix based on philosophy, 
geography, and the like.”134 Even though seven of the eleven committee members were over 
the age of fifty, they were relatively young when considering the Senate as a whole at the 
time.135 Many of these distinguished senators on the Church Committee were strong, 
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opinionated individuals who dedicated themselves to ensuring the fairness and accuracy of 
their own reports as well as those from the opposing party.  
The following Senators were selected to serve for the Democratic Party: Frank 
Church (Idaho), Philip A. Hart (Michigan), Walter F. Mondale (Minnesota), Walter D. 
Huddleston (Kentucky), Robert Morgan (North Carolina) and Gary Hart (Colorado).136 
Republican Senators selected were: Howard Baker (Tennessee), Barry Goldwater (Arizona), 
John Tower (Texas), Charles Mathias (Maryland), and Richard Schwekier (Pennsylvania).137 
Of these individuals, the Democratic members of the Committee selected Frank Church to 
serve as the Chairman, and the minority members selected John Tower to serve as the Vice 
Chairman. The selection of the Committee members reflected both the gravity of the 
situation and the desire to provide a representative cross-section of the respective parties. 
Originally, Mitch Mansfield wanted to back Philip Hart for the position of Chairman, 
but Hart’s poor health led to Frank Church lobbying for the position.138 According to friends, 
Church “almost knocked down Mansfield’s door to get it.”139 Church was profiled as a 
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“moral lightning rod.”140 In some eyes, he was a strong candidate for the position because of 
his status as newly elected to a fourth term.141 He vocally questioned America’s involvement 
in Vietnam in the 1960s and called America “the principal arms dispenser of the world.” In 
the mid-1970s, he opposed enhanced presidential powers when then-Secretary of Defense 
Melvin Laird argued that the Feed and Forage Act of 1861, an act allowing for the purchase 
of feed for cavalry horses after the allocated funds ran out if Congress was not in session, 
allowed President Nixon to keep U.S. troops in Cambodia even after Congress cut off the 
budget.142 Church also co-chaired the Special Committee on National Emergencies, “a major 
effort to rein in the national security state with its expansive presidential authority.”143 All of 
this experience uniquely qualified Church to take on possible overreach by secret agencies as 
well as presidents. 
Philip Hart was another particularly prominent member on the Democratic side. Even 
though Hart declined to become the chairman of the Committee due to the cancer that would 
claim his life in 1976, Mansfield wanted his expertise on the team. Hart had served in the 
United States Army during the Second World War and was injured on D-Day during the 
assault on Normandy. He had been a Senator for Michigan since 1959 and had been an 
influential individual throughout his tenure.144 Hart was particularly noted for his advocacy 
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of civil rights and consumer protection. He chaired the Antitrust and Monopoly 
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee and played a significant role in the passing 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Before his death, his fellow Congressmen honored Hart by 
naming the new Senate building after him.145 
Walter Mondale, Democratic Senator from Minnesota, also had strong credentials for 
membership on the Church Committee. He shored up his opinions on the investigations by 
writing his book The Accountability of Power (1975) which dealt with the things that “we as 
Americans must do to protect our system and our liberties from the encroachment of an 
unaccountable presidency.”146 He explored running for President in 1976; in fact, his 
declaration that he would not seek the Democratic nomination in 1974 surprised even his 
wife.  He chose to withdraw to ensure that he did not lose his individuality and identity. To 
him, this endeavor would include having to sell himself which he did not want to do. This 
choice, however, raised his profile throughout the nation. His membership on both the 
Finance Committee and the Budget Committee point to his leadership within the Senate.147 
Of particular note for this project, Mondale was the individual most interested in the 
domestic spying issues, while others were more focused on the Intelligence Community’s 
actions with regard to foreign affairs. Because of this, Church asked him to lead the 
subcommittee investigating allegations of domestic spying under which the FBI’s 
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COINTELPRO falls.148 His experience and opinions made him a good fit for working with 
the Committee. 
Gary Hart, a first-time Senator from Colorado, was appointed to the Committee three 
weeks after his election to Congress. He credits the experience as a steep learning curve and 
important education that he had not expected to receive from the Senate.149 Prior to becoming 
a senator, he earned a law degree from Yale University and served as an attorney for the 
Department of Justice from 1964-1965 and for the Interior Department from 1965-1967.150 
While this prior experience could have encouraged Mansfield to put him on the Committee, 
his selection most likely represents an appeasement of the new reform faction within the 
party and an attempt to bring in a representative from the western states.  
Republican choices also signify the commitment to the investigation of the issue at 
hand. Texas Senator John Tower brought gravitas and experience to the team. After Lyndon 
B. Johnson vacated his position to become the Vice President, Tower became the first state-
wide elected Republican in Texas since Reconstruction. The fact that he retained his position 
after that first election shows his ability to communicate both across the political aisle and 
with his constituents in Texas. During his tenure in the Senate, he became the father of the 
modern Republican party in Texas.151 This influence and longevity is just one example of his 
ability to lead in difficult situations. Hugh Scott, the leader of the Senate Republicans, 
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designated Tower to become the “damage control officer” when he assigned him to the 
Church Committee. Tower saw the investigation as “an extension of the Watergate hearings.” 
His schedule already included being the chairman of the Republican Policy Committee and a 
ranking member of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.152 He also 
served on the Armed Services Committee for the last twenty years of his career, including 
during the Church Committee’s investigations.153 His abilities as a “people manager” and his 
impressive history of fourteen years in the Senate led to his position as the vice chairman of 
the Committee.154 
Joining Tower on the Republican side was Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), who was already 
well-known throughout the nation due to his ill-fated Presidential campaign in 1964.155 
Fearmongering, detailed in Lionel Lokos’ book Hysteria 1964, plagued his campaign. 
Goldwater is often quoted as saying, “Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice; moderation 
in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.”156 This quote, derived from Cisero, is strong, divisive, 
and memorable. It describes what many credited as his downfall - namely that he did not 
publicly distance himself from the extremists at the Right, which made some constituents 
believe that he stood by assertions made by these groups. One such group, the John Birch 
society, stated that Eisenhower was “the most completely opportunistic and unprincipled 
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politician America has ever raised to high office.”157 This exemplified the type of beliefs that 
his opponents accused him of holding. His condemnation of “moderation in the pursuit of 
justice” opened his beliefs to ridicule by his political enemies. Because extremist groups 
supported his candidacy, some believed that he did not deserve to be nominated.158 However, 
he also said, “if a man told the truth, that if a man acted according to his honest convictions 
and the feelings of his heart, that man, even though defeated, would be a man who could live 
with himself in the years to come.”159  
After his defeat, he returned to service within the Senate. His ability to return to the 
Senate shows his tenacity. He ran on his reputation as “honest, sincere, saying what he 
thinks” which allowed him to be a divisive but strong Senator in his various roles on 
committees.160 At the time of the investigation, he served on the Armed Services Committee 
with Tower and had experience in intelligence oversight.161 His perspective and willingness 
to speak his mind made him an invaluable asset to Tower in their participation in the 
investigation.162  
Procedures of the Committee 
One of the first orders of business after the resolution to create the investigation 
passed was the formation of the Committee’s procedures and specific goals. The Committee 
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created twelve rules. These rules set the foundation for the progress of the Committee. They 
established the path that the Congressmen intended to follow. They wanted to hold the 
Intelligence Community accountable for their actions in front of the public. The first rule 
dealt with the parameters for calling meetings of the Committee. Not only were regular 
meetings scheduled but special meetings could be called by either the Chairman or by the 
written request of six or more members of the Committee. The second rule dealt with the 
conduct of those meetings. As much as possible, they were to be open to the public. They 
also allowed for the possibility of closed hearings for more sensitive information, but they 
remained firm to ensure that for the most part officials came and justified their decisions in 
front of them and the nation. Rule three established that any meeting open to the public 
would be subject to photographic, radio, television, or any other media coverage.163 
Establishing within the rules that their hearings could be covered by the media showed their 
commitment to accountability and honoring the public’s right to know. 
Rule four stated that investigations into any facet of the Intelligence Community 
could only be initiated if a majority of the members of the Committee specifically authorized 
it; however, a specific member could pursue any inquiry individually unless a majority vote 
of the members of the Committee prohibited it specifically.164 This established that 
individuals from either side of the political aisle would be able to focus their inquiry in the 
direction that they found the most important and impactful. This doubled down on their 
commitment to bipartisanship.   
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Rule five gave the Chairman the power to issue subpoenas for witnesses, memoranda, 
documents, records, or any other material. The Chairman, in conjunction with the Vice 
Chairman, could also delegate other members this authority. Finally, the fifth rule stipulated 
that each subpoena had to include a copy of Senate Resolution 21, 94th Congress, 1st 
Session. Rule six established the following standards for taking testimony: the witness must 
be given prior notice and an oath of affirmation; they could bring or be provided counsel; 
they could make a statement at the beginning and closing of their testimony; and they would 
be given the opportunity to inspect and correct their statements.165 This final commitment to 
allowing individuals to check the voracity of their statements, including giving them the 
opportunity to see how they were understood by their listeners, likely greatly assured 
potential witnesses of the Committee’s intention to truthfully portray the material they 
gathered rather than twisting the facts to fit their agenda. 
The seventh rule created Procedures for Handling Classified or Sensitive Material. 
These established security precautions for the staff offices such as a security guard and 
identification protocols as well as creating secure reading facilities for sensitive or classified 
documents and materials and reiterating the need for adherence to the protection rule of 
“need-to-know” to prevent the spread of classified materials.166 Developing this culture of 
respect for the sensitive material in the official Rules of Procedure likely helped to convince 
the intelligence agencies of the Committee’s commitment to treating the subject of their 
investigation carefully. Rule eight provided guidelines to ensure that Committee members 
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had ample time to prepare for meetings.167 This shows respect for the busy lives that all of 
the Committee members led and discouraged partisan manipulation of the meeting time in an 
attempt to sway the investigation in a particular direction. 
Rule nine stated that staff members and consultants had to be appointed and 
confirmed by the vote of the Committee. It authorized the Chief Counsel and Staff Director 
to oversee the day-to-day running of the staff and investigation. This sensible establishment 
of dedicated individuals to run interference between the mammoth staff and the incredibly 
busy Committee members allowed for quite a bit of stability within the investigation so that 
progress would continue even when the Senators were traveling or unavailable due to their 
other commitments. Rule ten bestowed the Chairman with the authority to discover locations 
and experts to ensure that the investigation could proceed at a reasonable pace. Rule eleven 
provided for recommendations by the Committee as a whole and separate opinions of 
individual Committee members.168 Once again, this signals the intention of bipartisanship 
even in their final report. Not requiring that such disparate minds come to a single conclusion 
allowed for a consensus to be reached without any person being required to sign off on a 
concept with which they did not agree. Finally, the twelfth rule allowed for amendments to 
the rules.169 They acknowledged the possible fluidity of their situation by establishing ways 
in which they could change their rules. 
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The progress made by establishment of these rules was bolstered by the creation of 
task forces to tackle different issues.170 Staff members were split up to cover the following 
areas: military intelligence, domestic intelligence, foreign intelligence, and the relationship 
between the White House and the Intelligence Community which the investigators called 
Command and Control.171 These task forces were manned by fifty-three investigators and the 
Senate allocated enough funds to hire 135 staff members in order to conduct a thorough 
investigation.172 Congress conferred security clearances on those staff members after the FBI 
conducted background checks on them. They did not have to take polygraph tests because of 
the general attitude within the Senate that they were “twentieth-century witchcraft.”173 This 
expedited the process and allowed the team to come together quickly in order to begin 
investigating the various charges. 
Frederick A. O. Schwarz Jr. was hired as the Chief Counsel or head lawyer of the 
Congressional inquiry. Schwarz made the judgment call early on that “The best we could do 
was to pick out ten, fifteen, maybe even twenty subjects and get really into depth.”174 He 
focused on the chronology of alleged abuses to get the investigation started in an orderly 
manner. Schwarz then created a discovery plan to identify records necessary from each 
agency and established a fact-finding strategy. This strategy allowed for focused requests for 
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documents from the White House and the intelligence agencies and ensured a limited scope 
of requests. Then, based on these documents, staffers prepared initial questions to investigate 
and requested follow-up documentation. Finally, a preliminary list of key witnesses was 
created using the information gathered in discovery.175 
In his article for the Washington Post, Harry Rositzke, who retired from the CIA after 
twenty-seven years of service, commented that the scope and responsibilities of the 
Committee were “to establish facts, judge their legality or illegality, and recommend 
executive or legislative remedies if they are needed.”176 This succinctly defined the huge 
challenge facing the Committee and their staff. First, they planned to hold hearings with key 
witnesses, heads of agencies and departments in March, which would be followed by 
testimony about key cases throughout May and June. The following two months were set 
aside to create the reforms, leaving September to wrap up their report.177 In reality, the 
Committee found the process to be much more complicated and time consuming than their 
estimate. The investigation and reports were finalized April 26, 1967, seven months after 
their original deadline.178 
Although tension definitely existed between the two political parties involved in the 
Committee, an impressive level of bi-partisanship prevailed, especially between the 
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee. According to Schwarz, the typical ratio of 
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the two parties for Congressional Committees would have been seven Democrats to four 
Republicans as opposed to the much more similar six and five respectively that made up the 
Church Committee. This helped to encourage more diverse thinking rather than giving an 
advantage to the party beliefs of the Democrats. The role of Vice Chairman proved to be a 
substantive job as opposed to the titular role often given to the ranking minority member on 
other committees.179 Tower and Church met with President Ford as a unit when they went to 
request forms and information from him. While the cooperation from secret agencies was not 
always easily achieved, the investigators for the most part worked together across the aisle to 
fulfill the ultimate goal of exposing and fixing the issues within intelligence agencies and 
their ultimate leader the White House.180 
Over the course of fifteen months, the Church Committee and their staff held 126 full 
committee meetings and 40 subcommittee hearings, interviewed some 800 witnesses in both 
public and closed sessions, and analyzed 110,000 documents.181 The public hearings with 
prominent officials within the Intelligence Community took place through September, 
October, November, and December. Highlights of the hearings included details of abuse by 
multiple agencies, including the FBI, CIA, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the National 
Security Agency.182 Among the more sensational cases dealt with in public hearings were 
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CIA assassination and biological testing programs, White House and IRS domestic 
surveillance activities, and FBI involvement in the Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam War 
movements.  
The public hearings mostly consisted of interviews with officials within each agency 
of concern. For example, Tom Huston, of the Huston Plan which allowed for wide-scale mail 
opening programs for the CIA, testified before the Committee about his perspective on the 
threat towards the nation at the time which warranted the large scale privileges that he had 
argued should be allowed for intelligence agencies.183 William Sullivan, an Assistant 
Director with the FBI, gave his testimony regarding the FBI’s COINTELPRO which he had 
helped to create.184 Several of the agency’s other top officials, including the FBI’s White 
House liaison during the Johnson Administration, Cartha “Deke” DeLoach, gave their 
testimony to flesh out the information that the Committee found in all of the memoranda that 
they collected.185 CIA director William Colby was also called and questioned. Each hearing 
had the goal of both educating the public and holding the decision makers accountable for 
their actions. While these hearings did greatly exceed the time limit that had been created 
during the planning process, the Committee chose to proceed with hearings only when a 
subject was “adequately researched” rather than holding public hearings just to hold them.186 
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Another element of the investigative process was the meetings between staff 
members and victims of the overreach of various agencies, including the FBI’s 
COINTELPRO. Loch K. Johnson, a staff member who has written prolifically about his 
experience with the Church Committee, specified that these meetings were only arranged in 
those cases that were especially egregious.187 He personally met with Anatol Rapoport and 
showed him the declassified FBI files enumerating the actions taken against him because of 
his attempts to live out the American ideals of free speech and public debate over policy.188 
Rapoport’s son Tony recalls that his father was not surprised by the investigation — he had 
been through a similar investigation while applying for legal permanent residency in Canada 
with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police — but he was shocked by the extent of the actions 
taken against him.189 Tony said that his father was impressed with Johnson’s breadth of 
knowledge and was surprised by his openness.190 Anatol Rapoport and his family left before 
his career prospects were ruined, but his meeting with Loch Johnson was able to provide 
closure years after his multi-layered decision to relocate.  
By the end of the investigation, the Church Committee published their Final Report 
which consisted of seven books, all dealing with different issues that they had investigated in 
their different task forces. Each book ranged from 105 pages to 995 pages. Each thorough 
report included the background of each issue as well as the abuses that had been discovered 
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followed by findings and recommendations in order to combat the potential abuse that was 
discovered by the Church Committee.191 
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CHURCH COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS 
Findings 
The Church Committee established seven general findings in response to the actions 
of the FBI and other secret agencies against United States citizens. These findings and 
recommendations were carefully outlined in 204 of the 341 pages of the report. They focused 
on the following topics: violating and ignoring the law, overreach of domestic intelligence 
activity, excessive use of intrusive techniques, using covert action to disrupt and discredit 
domestic groups, political abuse of intelligence information, inadequate controls on 
dissemination and retention of information, and deficiencies in control and accountability. 
Each finding had several subfindings to help identify and analyze the characteristics shared 
by intelligence programs operating in violation of the law.192  
Violating and Ignoring the Law 
The most egregious element identified by the first finding, violating and ignoring the 
law, can be summarized in the following sentence: “While intelligence officers on occasion 
failed to disclose to their superiors’ programs which were illegal or of questionable legality, 
the Committee finds that the most serious breaches of duty were those of senior officials, 
who were responsible for controlling intelligence activities and generally failed to assure 
compliance with the law.”193  
In direct violation of Sections 1701-1703 of Title 18 of the United States Code — 
which prohibits the obstruction, interception, or opening of mail, the FBI and the CIA 
instituted 12 different covert mail opening programs between 1940 and 1973. During this 
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time, they both carried out warrantless “surreptitious entries” which violated state laws 
pertaining to trespass and burglary. The rights of countless Americans protected by the 
Fourth Amendment were violated by the FBI’s electronic surveillance program that failed to 
meet the standard of a substantial national security predicate. COINTELPRO specifically 
violated federal and state statutes in regard to mail fraud, wire fraud, incitement to violence, 
sending obscene material through the mail, and extortion. The Committee found that 
“fundamentally, the harassment of innocent citizens engaged in lawful forms of political 
expression did serious injury to the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and the 
right of the people to assemble peaceably and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.”194 All of these programs were in direct violation of local, state or federal statutes 
and greatly undermined the ability of these agencies to uphold the law. 
The lack of legal considerations greatly concerned the Committee. The striking 
testimony of William Sullivan, the Assistant Director of Intelligence in the FBI, caused much 
concern for many Americans for the protection offered by that agency. In reference to the 
FBI’s attempt to discredit Martin Luther King Jr., Sullivan said that he “never heard anyone 
raise the question of legality or constitutionality, never.”195 He opined that “In government… 
the general atmosphere is one of amorality.”196  
Even more concerning than that general attitude was the finding that agency officials 
went ahead with programs that they either assumed or were explicitly told were illegal. In 
1954, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover illustrated this attitude in a memo regarding the 
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placement of an electronic listening device in a suspected Communist sympathizer’s hotel 
room. He wrote: “Although such an installation will not be legal, it is believed that the 
intelligence information to be obtained will make such an installation necessary and 
desirable.”197 Regarding the FBI’s “black bag jobs,” Hoover said, “Such a technique involves 
trespass and is clearly illegal” as he allowed the program to continue.198 The Church 
Committee Report summarized this attitude as “breaking the law, was seen as useful in 
combating those who threatened the legal fabric of society.”199  
In 1970, Hoover briefed President Nixon that “the FBI is opposed to implementing 
any covert mail coverage because it is clearly illegal,” even though the FBI continued to 
receive information from the CIA’s mail opening program for a further three years.200 Often, 
intelligence officials claimed that they could not follow the law because the “enemy” did not. 
They sometimes justified these beliefs by holding themselves accountable to a law higher 
than the United States Code or Constitution — “The greater good, the national security” — 
as an FBI Counterintelligence Section Chief testified.201 
Culturally, the FBI held its agents to a standard of never allowing or contributing to 
the “embarrassment of the Bureau.” This allowed them to enforce the standards of tightening 
their internal security rather than stopping programs once their illegality came to light. In one 
example of this standard, the FBI required that agents write their anonymous letters on 
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commercially purchased stationery to ensure that it could not be traced back to them.202 All 
of their work had to lead back to legitimate sources outside the Bureau. 
The Church Committee also found that “intelligence agencies failed to disclose 
candidly programs and practices to their own General Counsels, and to Attorney Generals, 
Presidents, and Congress.”203 The FBI, specifically, did not brief any Attorney General on 
their black bag jobs, COINTELPRO practices, or participation in the CIA’s mail opening 
program.204 In pursuit of this secrecy, the Bureau was willing to go to extraordinary lengths 
while dealing with any agency in order to ensure that their misdeeds did not become 
available for even their designated watch dogs. 
For example, during the 1965-1966 mail covers investigation by Senator Edward 
Long, the FBI purposely withheld information from the investigative committee and wrote a 
press release for the Senator which said the subcommittee “conducted exhaustive research 
into the activities, procedures, and techniques of this agency [and] based upon careful 
study…we are fully satisfied that the FBI has not participated in highhanded or uncontrolled 
usage of wiretaps, microphones, or other electronic equipment.205” 
This was not factual as the “exhaustive research” was actually a ninety-minute 
briefing from FBI officials which purposefully avoided any surveillance activities that were 
questionable. When asked to testify about the electronic surveillance policy of the Bureau, 
FBI officials declined, citing concerns about “enemies in the press.” After both of these 
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investigative avenues were closed, officials informed the Associate Director that the situation 
had been “neutralized.”206 
The Church Committee also found that the FBI’s internal inspection mechanisms 
were not designed to keep their actions within legal bounds. The Bureau’s Inspection 
Division’s Assistant Director from 1964 to 1971 W. Mark Felt described his job as ensuring 
that programs functioned efficiently not constitutionally. He stated that the protection of 
constitutional values was not included in his job instructions. Even when overseeing 
questionable programs, Felt’s section did not “question the propriety of the policy;” they only 
ensured that Hoover’s policy was properly followed.207 
The Overreach of Domestic Intelligence Activity 
The Committee’s second finding focused on the fact that “many Americans and 
domestic groups [had] been subjected to investigation who were not suspected of criminal 
activity.”208 From 1955 to 1975, the FBI had opened 740,000 investigations into subversive 
matters and 190,000 investigations into extremist matters.209 Throughout this twenty year 
time period, the Bureau observed and catalogued the lives of a wide variety of individuals 
throughout American society, most of whom posed no obvious threat. 
The FBI targeted their mail opening programs on individuals who opposed the 
Vietnam War.210 Some of this was encouraged by the pressure from members of Congress to 
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collect domestic intelligence without “precise statutory standards.”211 The FBI’s tasking to 
undertake a “comprehensive study of the whole New Left” took the agency away from their 
legal charge of investigating specific groups on the grounds of violations of the law. This 
shifted focus opened the door for such actions as collecting the Rabble Rouser Index which 
collected profiles of individuals who were deemed “demagogues” or effective and influential 
speakers who might sway others to their way of thinking.212 This allowed for the 
investigation of individuals like Anatol Rapoport who had not broken the law but was in a 
position to influence the opinions of many young people. 
The Committee found that “such intelligence surveillance of groups and individuals 
has greatly exceeded the legitimate interest of the government in law enforcement and the 
prevention of violence.”213 The nebulous basis for their investigations into individuals of 
interest allowed the FBI to gather much more information and power than necessary when 
considering the threat posed by individuals in the New Left movement.  
This overcollection was described as a “vacuum cleaner” approach — “drawing in all 
available information about groups and individuals including their lawful political activity 
and details of their personal lives.”214 This encouraged monitoring of efforts to influence 
public opinion, voters, and government bodies which is perfectly legal and bolstered by the 
Constitution. The scope of subjects was expanded from individuals with “a potential for 
violence” to those who the Special Agents in Charge of FBI Field Offices deemed worthy of 
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surveillance or monitoring “due to extremist activities.” The Committee considered this 
collection of private information unrelated to criminal or violent activities as “a serious 
misuse of governmental power.”215 
Excessive Use of Intrusive Techniques 
The techniques described earlier in this chapter as well as throughout this thesis have 
already been established as intrusive and excessive. The Church Committee expressed 
concern that the legal standards in place for the use of some of the techniques which could be 
appropriate under specific circumstances were insufficient.216 The legal statutes which were 
in place were eroded by intelligence agencies and the Presidents directing them. 
One example of this is wiretapping without a warrant which was limited and 
standardized by the Supreme Court and Congress. The Federal Communications Act of 1934 
made intercepting, divulging, and publishing information gained from wire and radio 
transmission illegal for “any person.” The Supreme Court extended this to include federal 
agents and also made any information gleaned from such sources inadmissable in court. The 
FBI interpreted this standard as information could not be disseminated outside of the Justice 
Department, and wiretaps could be used as long as they were not intended for prosecution 
purposes. President Franklin D. Roosevelt further lessened the impact of protective efforts by 
proclaiming that this standard did not apply to “grave matters involving the defense of the 
nation.” In 1946, this was further expanded to include domestic investigations “where human 
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life is in jeopardy.”217 This situation is just one element in which the executive branch of the 
government ignored the intentions and restrictions of the legislative branch. 
Using Covert Action to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic Groups 
The Committee focused on the specific COINTELPRO covert actions which were 
unleashed on individual Americans. The tactics used in COINTELPRO were originally 
intended to be used against foreign actors but slowly transformed into American citizens 
being targeted with those programs.218 This covert action program attempted “to discredit 
them, using dangerous and degrading tactics which are abhorrent in a free and decent 
society.”219 The program was ended in 1971 due to “the threat of public exposure.” One of 
the most adamant proclamations of the Committee was that “[a] law enforcement agency 
must not secretly usurp the functions of judge and jury, even when the investigation reveals 
criminal activity.”220  
Even though the program was justified by the Bureau through the lens of national 
security and violence prevention, many of the targeted individuals were “concededly 
nonviolent,” “not controlled by a foreign power,” and “posed no threat to the ‘national 
security.’”221 These individuals’ First Amendment rights were violated with the program 
focusing on “deter[ing] citizens from joining groups, ‘neutraliz[ing]’ those who were already 
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members, and prevent[ing] or inhibit[ing] the expression of ideas.”222 Approximately 39% of 
the actions taken against New Left targets focused on stopping individuals from speaking, 
teaching, writing, or publishing - a clear attempt at suppression of free speech.223 As 
exhibited in the Anatol Rapoport case study, a tactic frequently employed by the FBI was 
attempting to facilitate the removal of individuals of concern from their places of 
employment or funding.224 
Headquarters carefully weighed these tactics against the “greater good” which was 
determined on their own scale of the value produced versus the “known or risked harm to the 
target.”225 Because associated risks could not be determined prior to the execution of the 
tactics, their means of establishing the use of these measures did not reflect the true purpose 
of their agency which is “adherence to the rule of law mandated by the Constitution.”226  
Political Abuse of Intelligence Information 
In terms of political abuse of information, the Committee spread the fault more 
equally among the agencies that provided intelligence information and the administrations 
that requested it. The Committee’s report described the disclosures made by the FBI, 
sometimes requested and sometimes sent gratuitously, as politically motivated, stating that 
“the FBI buttressed its own position in the political structure.”227 The widespread and 
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somewhat justified concern that the Bureau had derogatory information on politicians and 
critics led Hale Boggs, the Majority Leader of the House of Representatives from 1971 until 
his disappearance in 1972, to say, “Freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of 
action for men in public life can be compromised quite as effectively by the fear of 
surveillance as by the fact of surveillance.”228 
This quote demonstrates the power consolidated by the FBI through their information 
collection and dissemination. Through their attempts to “protect society,” the Bureau greatly 
influenced the information available to those individuals who made up American society. 
The Church Committee recognized the right of law enforcement officials to state their 
opinions, but qualified that allowance by situating the problem “in the covert use of power or 
position of trust to influence others.”229  
Particularly notable were White House requests for information, including name 
checks of political opponents or critics through the Bureau’s files in order to gain politically 
useful information.230 The finding noted that this issue spanned across multiple 
administrations, including Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon.231 The Committee’s 
Chief Counsel F.A.O. Schwarz Jr. said, “our single most important finding” was that “every 
president — and there were six between Franklin Roosevelt and Richard Nixon — had 
                                                
228 Quoted in Church Report, Book II, 225; “BOGGS, Thomas Hale, Sr.,” US House of 
Representatives: History, Art & Archives, accessed April 25, 2021, 
https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/9547. Representative Boggs was presumed dead in 
1972 after he disappeared during a campaign flight from Anchorage to Juneau, Alaska. 
229 Church Report, Book II, 226. 
230 Church Report, Book II, 226. 
231 Church Report, Book II, 226-231. 
61 
abused their secret powers.”232 This issue remained consistent across decades and different 
political leanings.  
Adding to this abuse was the FBI’s claim that they “did not decide what was political 
or what represented potential strife and violence.” Deke DeLoach, the same Bureau official 
who made the above statement, qualified it by saying, “We are an investigative agency and 
we passed on all data."233 This general attitude meant that partisan political information was 
passed on to Presidents for decades alongside reports concerning potentially violent groups 
and individuals, with little regard for how the information might be used.234 
Inadequate Controls on Dissemination and Retention 
The lack of regulation of the information flow within the Intelligence Community led 
to further violations of individual rights. One example of agencies volunteering excessive 
amounts of information is the flow of unofficial requests on dissident Americans from the 
FBI to the CIA which could exceed 1,000 requests a month. Despite or perhaps because of 
the large flow of data between agencies, the receiving individuals described the information 
disseminated to them as “junk” or “irrelevant.”235 Even though Bureau officials found that 
the information they received from the NSA had “very little in the way of good product,” 
their overall policy was “disseminate, disseminate, disseminate.”236 This was an insurance 
policy against previous experiences in which Hoover had been highly criticized for not 
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sharing information with the White House.237 As documented in the Committee’s report, the 
FBI disseminated an impressive amount of information on all types of people, from political 
opponents to war protestors, to individuals throughout the federal government. 
Deficiencies in Control and Accountability 
The oversight bodies tasked with responsibility over the government’s intelligence 
agencies failed in their duty through the lack of investigations into their actions and 
restrictions on their power. Presidents asked for specific reports from the FBI but failed to 
specify their terms or limits, such as information on “subversive activities” which remained 
undefined until just before the Church Committee and lacked any restrictions regarding the 
breadth of information gathered or safeguarding the rights of American citizens.238 Congress 
abdicated their responsibility and authority over U.S. intelligence agencies by failing to fully 
exercise their ability to define the jurisdiction given to those agencies and to oversee their 
activities.239 The finding solidified the concept that the individuals in the positions of 
President and Attorney General “— as the chief executive and the principle law enforcement 
officer of the United States Government — bear ultimate responsibility for the activities of 
executive agencies under their command,” even when those activities were not directly 
authorized.240 
The Church Committee exposed the greatest weakness with this system by 
highlighting the fact that “many illegal or abusive domestic intelligence operations were 
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terminated only after they had been exposed or threatened with exposure by Congress or the 
news media.”241 This type of defiance until the last possible moment did not bode well for 
the efficacy of oversight from Congress, which is the role assigned to them by the 
Constitution.242 The fact that it took possible exposure to the American public for intelligence 
agencies to cease their questionable activities shows the level of disregard that those agencies 
held for Congress and its power over their actions.  
Despite this lack of respect, “intelligence agencies cannot be left to police 
themselves.”243 Throughout the report, examples of agencies expanding their power slowly 
but surely whilst ignoring criticisms or concerns brought to them by Congress abound. Even 
within these agencies, details of certain questionable programs were highly restricted not 
only to protect the tradecraft but also to hide these violations of the law from governing 
authorities. Such blatant abuses and disregard for the law clearly established the need for 
better structured oversight of agencies with secret powers. 
Recommendations 
Based on these findings, the Church Committee crafted recommendations to fill these 
holes in oversight and protect the system from further abuse. They recognized that “the 
power of government to conduct proper domestic intelligence activities under effective 
restraints and controls must be preserved.” Similar to other positions of power, “[i]n times of 
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crisis, the Government will exercise its power to conduct domestic intelligence activities to 
the fullest extent.”244 
The report defines three areas where the executive branch strayed from the 
Constitutionally established checks and balances: excessive executive power, excessive 
secrecy, and avoidance of the Rule of Law. These three excesses allowed abuses to occur 
because of their compounding power. Through Executive Orders, Presidential power 
permitted intelligence activities to avoid oversight from external sources. This secrecy bred 
abuse as it is wont to do. This set a bad example for the citizenry of the nation and allowed 
critics a genuine avenue through which to challenge the government’s power.245 
The purpose of many of these recommendations was to force the Bureau to respect 
the distinction between legal dissent and criminal conduct. American citizens needed to be 
able to peacefully express dissenting opinions in order to preserve democratic government. 
The report found that personal privacy is essential to liberty and the pursuit of happiness 
which makes it crucial to protect.246 The report stated unequivocally that “[e]xcessive 
intelligence activity which undermines individual rights must end.”247 This principle goes 
even further to establish that the rights of free speech and association must be preserved and 
protected from governmental interference.248 
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The Church Committee determined that the FBI should have jurisdiction over 
domestic security investigations. They admonished those agents probing into such cases to 
shift their focus from issues of political advocacy to dangerous actions. This established area 
of responsibility cleared up overlap which was occurring among several separate federal 
agencies to encourage efficiency and accountability.249 
One important caveat established by these recommendations was that they were “to 
prohibit any agency from doing indirectly that which it would be prohibited from doing 
directly.”250 This addressed many loopholes that had been exploited by federal agencies — 
the mail opening program by the CIA from which the FBI profited is one example of this. 
Intelligence Agencies are Subject to the Rule of Law 
The Committee proposed that a legal framework be created to ensure future oversight 
of the intelligence agencies. This motion established that legislation should come first and 
then be supported by administrative regulations. One concept which the Church Committee 
absolutely opposed was the theory of inherent or implied authority, which allowed agencies 
“to violate the Constitution” in pursuit of national security objectives.251 
The goal of the recommendations was to allow criminal or counterintelligence 
investigations to continue unhampered while preventing the abuses which had previously 
occurred. One oft-mentioned strategy was to shift the focus of investigations from political 
rhetoric or association to criminal conduct. The Committee acknowledged the need for 
investigations which did not follow the traditional, and more secure, route of crimes which 
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had already been committed.252 This admission lends credence to their collective 
recommendations as they allow for situations which do not fit into a neat solution.  
Centralization of Supervision, Investigative Responsibility, and the Use of Covert 
Techniques 
The consolidation of certain responsibilities and techniques into the Department of 
Justice enabled Congress to focus their oversight on the appropriate intelligence agency. The 
Church Committee report gave the FBI jurisdiction over domestic security investigations 
which included the use of covert techniques. This centralization made the Justice Department 
accountable for adhering to U.S. Constitutional and legal mandates.253 
This area of FBI jurisdiction was further clarified by the formation of a hierarchy 
during civil disturbance events. The United States Army is authorized to assist in instances of 
civil disturbance. However, the Church Committee removed much of the Army’s 
investigative power and placed it under the FBI’s purview. This seeming contradiction was 
clarified by establishing that the FBI would lead the investigations and provide necessary 
information to the Army in the event that their assistance was needed. The FBI’s authority 
regarding civil disturbances was further limited to those events which require federal 
troops.254 That standard was even further limited to ensure that the information was gathered 
in order to support the President in their decision making, military officials in their troop 
positioning, and state and local officials in their coordination with the military officials.255 
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Another recommendation continues the standard of “reasonable suspicion” which is 
necessary in investigating criminal activity. However, the Committee specified that “[i]n no 
event should the FBI open a preliminary or full preventive intelligence investigation based 
upon information that an American is advocating political ideas or engaging in lawful 
political activities or is associating with others for the purpose of petitioning the government 
for redress of grievances or other such constitutionally protected purposes.”256 They set a 
limit of thirty days for preliminary preventive intelligence investigations which allows for 
agents to look into sudden threats while preventing long-term cases without the limitations 
placed upon a full investigation.257 This standard allows for difficult and unique situations 
while also setting a standard of oversight and responsibility. 
The Church Committee also gave the FBI authority over background investigations 
necessary for prospective federal employees. This restricted collection to information 
necessary to establish suitability for employment, a reasonable and necessary element for the 
success of the Bureau within the government.258 
Authorized Investigative Techniques 
The Committee also established the following standard for tactics used by the FBI: 
“the more intrusive the technique, the more stringent the procedural checks that will be 
applied to it.”259 This meant that overt techniques, such as interviews, required very little 
oversight as opposed to the covert techniques, which could be anything from electronic 
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surveillance to a review of credit records. The three considerations which the Committee 
developed to establish boundaries for covert techniques were the potential for abuse, the 
practicability of applying the procedure to the technique, and the facts and circumstances 
giving rise to the request for use of the technique (whether the information would lead to a 
preliminary investigation or a full investigation).260 The Committee strongly believed in the 
necessity of judicial warrants whenever dealing with electronic surveillance.261 This standard 
of judicial warrants provided a reasonable measure of oversight to resolve the question of 
allowable covert techniques, including search and seizure, surreptitious entry, and mail 
opening.262 
Plans for Internal Accountability 
The Committee also proposed to significantly expand authority and scope of the 
Attorney General in order to serve the purpose of considering the morality and legality of the 
programs utilized by the FBI. The report proposed that the Attorney General have authority 
over the investigations which could arise into alleged violations of law due to these domestic 
intelligence recommendations.263 On a more long term basis, the Committee offered the 
solution that: “The General Counsel of the FBI and of each other intelligence agency should 
review all significant proposed agency activities to determine their legality and 
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constitutionality.”264 The General Counsel was also given access to all information within the 
agency in order to conduct reviews of their agency’s activities.265 
Another safeguard set a standard for the FBI’s Director. The Committee expressed 
concern that laying the blame for the COINTELPRO program, and other questionable 
activities, at the feet of officials “may become an excuse for inaction.”266 Because of the 
huge influence of J. Edgar Hoover over the Bureau during his long tenure, he could easily be 
turned into a scapegoat, especially since he had passed away before the Committee began 
their investigations. They suggested, however, that the power of the director be limited by 
establishing the position as a Presidential appointment that can only serve for a maximum of 
eight years.267 This acknowledges the role and influence of Hoover while also holding the 
agency as a whole accountable for their actions. 
Conclusion 
These are only a select few of the ninety-six recommendations that the Church 
Committee made in relation to domestic intelligence.268 The overarching theme of these 
recommendations was allowing the agencies to do their jobs while limiting the opportunities 
for the abuses that the Committee documented through their research and interviews. While 
not all of these recommendations were put into action, many of them, such as the FBI 
Director’s term of eight years and the higher standard for covert techniques, remain in use 
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today. The influence of the Church Committee was quickly eroded by Presidential orders, 
explored in the next chapter; however, their intentional allowances for the difficulties and 
ambiguities of the job retained the flexibility required for the Intelligence Community to 
respond to unanticipated threats necessary to fulfill its mission in a rapidly changing and 




Effects of Recommendations 
While some of the recommendations made by the Church Committee were 
incorporated into the practice of the Intelligence Community and Congressional oversight 
committees, the limitation on these agencies’ power quickly eroded. Warnings against the 
consolidation of power which allowed COINTELPRO to occur remain very relevant as the 
executive branch has continued to attempt to shield their actions from Congress and legalize 
those tactics that were found so problematic.269  
In 1976, the Department of Justice released the “Levi guidelines,” named after then-
Attorney General Edward Levi, which “prohibited investigations or operations designed to 
disrupt organizations based solely on unpopular opinion.”270 These guidelines also set limits 
on preliminary and full investigations inspired by the recommendations described in the 
earlier chapter. The preliminary investigation was allowed in order to ascertain a factual basis 
for opening a full investigation into engagement in unlawful activities that might involve 
violence. This limitation correlates with a significant drop in domestic security investigations 
from 4,868 in March, 1976 to 26 in December, 1981.271 
In 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This 
provided for rotating judges whose assignment was to approve or deny warrants for 
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surveillance in cases targeting a ‘foreign power’ or the ‘agent of a foreign power.’272 These 
seven federal judges were appointed to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) 
which would oversee this program. Even though this act established a legislative check over 
the actions of the executive branch, subsequent Presidential administrations have consistently 
and persistently argued that they can approve warrantless searches without any oversight 
from the judicial branch.273 
Even though these limitations were reasonable to ensure a secure and free society, 
they were quickly rolled back by Executive Order [EO] 12333 issued in 1981. President 
Reagan reauthorized many of the techniques which had been banned by the Levi guidelines. 
Shortly afterwards, he signed EO 12345 which stated that the FBI and the rest of the 
intelligence agencies had “legal authority” to “withhold information about their use of 
counterintelligence methods.”274 
In 1982, FBI Director William Webster said that the Levi guidelines were “no longer 
adequate to guide us in dealing with the kinds of terrorist groups that we are confronted with 
today.”275 Attorney General William Smith released his Smith guidelines in 1983 which 
removed the more restricted preliminary investigation step and made the standard for 
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opening those investigations “facts of circumstances reasonably indicate” actions of force or 
violence in pursuit of political or social goals.276 
Only two incidents of international terrorism were reported by the FBI between 1984 
and 1996.277 Despite this fact, Congress authorized the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) which restored the intelligence community to “almost the full 
range of repressive techniques which had been quietly continued after COINTELPRO was 
supposedly terminated.”278 This Act described national security as “the national defense, 
foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.”279 This further opened groups 
to investigations as the secretary of state was empowered to accuse them of terrorist activity 
if their actions constituted a threat to the broadly defined national security of the United 
States.280 
Throughout successive administrations, the Levi guidelines inspired by the 
recommendations of the Church Committee have routinely been weakened by small 
increments. Using examples of different moments of violence from individuals within the 
United States, successive administrations have been able to expand their power and abilities. 
However, the Church Committee seems to have expected this through this highly relevant 
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statement: “Lawlessness by citizens does not justify lawlessness by Government.”281 In this 
case, they argued that the ends did not and had not justified the means. 
In 2001, the tragic events of September 11 seemed to obliterate the few hard-fought 
parameters that still existed from the Church Committee. Some critics of the Committee 
claimed that it “unilaterally disarm[ed] our intelligence capabilities.282 The Chief Counsel of 
the Church Committee, F.A.O. Schwarz, Jr., argued in his book Unchecked and Unbalanced 
that this criticism ignores the Committee’s legacy of encouraging the FBI to shift its focus 
from political dissent to terrorism.283 Schwarz answered another criticism that the 
Intelligence Community was still “reeling” from the limitations of the Committee by asking 
how this could be true after more than a quarter of a century and the administrations of five 
Presidents, one of whom (Bush Sr.) had worked within the Intelligence Community and 
should have known about and fixed this issue if he thought it existed.284 His argument is 
supported by all of the material differences made to most of the long-term guidelines left by 
the Church Committee. 
Because of concerns about future attacks and American safety, the Senate passed the 
PATRIOT Act.285 No Committee debated the terms. David Cole and James Dempsey 
claimed that “after three weeks of behind-the-scenes discussions between a few Senators and 
the administration, a bill was introduced in the Senate… that included essentially all of the 
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administration’s proposals.”286 Those proposals greatly increased the law enforcement and 
intelligence powers of the federal government while also expanding the expectations to 
include the prevention of terrorism rather than the investigation of the crime after the fact.287 
The precis of the Act states that the purpose is “[t]o deter and punish terrorist acts in the 
United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for 
other purposes.”288 The Act increased the parameters for an FBI agent to procure a FISA 
warrant from the FISC. As long as criminal investigations could be expected to 
“significant[ly]” gather foreign intelligence information, they could now receive Foreign 
Intelligence surveillance warrants. While the review court was designed to be a protective 
measure, only eighty-five cases have been rejected in the last twenty years out of the nearly 
28,000 cases presented.289 This concerningly low rejection percentage of about .3% is 
slightly mollified by the number of applications that were modified before they were 
approved. That number, about 45%, still does not assuage concerns that the FISC is just a 
rubber stamp along the path to governmental abuse. 
The PATRIOT Act included broad allowances which hearken back to the 
expectations and vague language that preceded COINTELPRO and other broad violations of 
American civil rights. Congress and the FBI would be wise to remember this history and 
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their shared goal to remain vigilant against excessive investigations into the lives of 
American citizens.  
Conclusion 
During the FBI’s just over a century existence, they have faced many challenges and 
protected the United States from threats both within and without. However, due to the 
combined circumstances of an incredibly powerful, long-term leader in J. Edgar Hoover and 
intense fears and expectations from the American public, they were also able to exceed their 
boundaries of protection in order to preserve the political and social status quo. In the pursuit 
of continued security and prevention of violence, the FBI’s agents, officials, and director 
engaged in activities that violated the civil rights of American citizens and endangered their 
democratic way of life. Even though these violations started with good intentions and 
attempted to achieve the “greater good,” no one agency should be allowed to decide for the 
nation what would be best for them without allowing others to ensure their legality. 
Ironically, Rapoport himself hit the nail on the head of the Bureau’s biggest issue 
with COINTELPRO in his book Certainties and Doubts when he wrote, “Just as it is easier 
to define disease than good health (except as absence of disease which is side-stepping the 
problem), so it is easier to define evil than good.”290 The FBI was given the directive from 
the Executive branch as well as members of Congress to preemptively discover and stop the 
activities of groups who would seek to disrupt the American way of government. The Bureau 
ran into the problem of the near-impossibility of proving that an individual was innocent.291 
The penalty for being wrong would be ridicule and blame for any incident that might happen; 
                                                
290 Rapoport, Certainties and Doubts, 167. 
291 Church Report, Book II, 88-89. 
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whereas, there was very little motivation to stop looking into a concerning individual. That 
impossible standard still exists today, but it has better defined parameters from Congress 
because of the recommendations made by the Church Committee, which came out of cases 
like Rapoport’s. 
The FBI’s mission is “to protect the American people and uphold the 
Constitution.”292 This simple motto encapsulates the goal and aim of the recommendations of 
the Church Committee. As Ross Wilson, an FBI Staff Operations Specialist, says, “the FBI is 
just ordinary people doing an extraordinary job.”293 This attitude is essential to ensure the 
continued success of the Bureau and the earned trust of the American people. It is not enough 
that these ordinary people succeed in their job. They must also ensure that they obey and 
uphold the Constitution. If each employee asks themselves both if they can and should be 
doing each action they undertake, the future of democracy and freedom in the United States 
will be secured. External oversight is one means of ensuring that the Bureau continues to 
fulfill its stated mission and to operate with the highest integrity. 
Even beyond the FBI, the executive and legislative branches of government have a 
serious charge to protect and uphold the Constitution. In paraphrasing the famous story of 
Benjamin Franklin speaking to a woman outside of the Philadelphia Constitutional 
Convention, F.A.O. Schwarz, Jr. stated, “[t]he Constitution endures so long as the American 
people preserve it.”294 Because of fear and anger among the American people, the office of 
                                                
292 “What Is the Mission of the FBI?,” FBI (FBI, May 7, 2016), 
https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-the-mission-of-the-fbi. 
293 Ross Wilson (FBI Staff Operations Specialist), in conversation with the author, June 
2020. 
294 Schwarz and Huq, Unbalanced and Unchecked, 200. The legend goes: Dr. Benjamin 
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the President has successfully increased the power of the executive branch while lessening 
the oversight designed into the checks and balances of the American governmental system.295 
This republic that was designed for the U.S. in that hot city hall in the summer of 1787 is 
imperfect and has faced many challenges to its form. Its system of checks and balances, 
however, strengthens the entire government as it fights against abuse and lends credibility to 
its actions. This system is essential to the continued success of the land of the free and the 
home of the brave. 
 
  
                                                
Constitution was written, what kind of government do we have, a republic or a monarchy? 
To which he replied, a republic, if you can keep it. This article from the Seattle Times “‘A 
republic, if you can keep it:’ Did Ben Franklin really say Impeachment Day’s favorite 
quote?” by Gillian Brockell for The Washington Post does a great job of researching and 
debunking this quote: https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation/a-republic-if-you-
can-keep-it-did-ben-franklin-really-say-impeachment-days-favorite-quote/ 
295 Schwarz and Huq, Unbalanced and Unchecked, 200. 
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